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Abstract
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs – up to level `i – about the state of nature coincide, we
obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological
properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash
(`i;`¡i)-equilibria capture players’ inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.
The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (`i;`¡i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustrate
the constructions.
Keywords: Incomplete-information games, high-order reasoning, type space, quotient space, hierar-
chies of beliefs, bounded rationality. JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
Starting with Harsanyi’s (1967-1968) seminal work, players’ private information is conveniently represented
by types, which correspond to inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs. In many applications, the predictions of standard
game theory can be heavily dependent on the speciﬁcation of high-order beliefs. As a matter of fact,
Weinstein and Yildiz (2007a) show that any rationalizable action (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, and
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007) of any type can be made into the uniquely rationalizable action for
an open set of perturbed types under an appropriate class of beliefs perturbations. This generalizes the
intuition provided by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) in their global games. Nonetheless, experiments have
highlighted that high-order beliefs might have a less large relevance in practice (see the literature mentioned
in the context of the examples given in Sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.1). Weinstein and Yildiz (2007b) write that
bounds on rationality translate into bounds on beliefs, and consequently situations where high-order beliefs
are decisive might necessitate a change of paradigm.
In this paper we provide an approach towards relaxing the (implicit) assumptions made on players’ ability to
keep track of high-order beliefs. The approach we propose consists of deﬁning certain quotient type spaces,
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1the elements of which gather – or “amalgamate” in the usage of Aumann and Dreze (2008, Section VI) –
types that have the same low-order beliefs, where low means up to some order `i. Such quotient spaces will
be referred to as `i-quotient type spaces. The underlying behavioral hypothesis is that a player acts as if he
could not tell his own types apart that have identical belief hierarchies from order 1 to `i. Players hence
condition their interim expected payoﬀ on their type belonging to its equivalence class rather than on the
type itself.
We would like to stress that our quotient type spaces embody one speciﬁc behavioral hypothesis. A researcher
interested in modeling other aspects of human behavior can adopt diﬀerent notions of similarity between
types and possibly deﬁne quotient type spaces accordingly.
Standard equilibrium analysis can be performed by means of `i-quotient type spaces: in an (`i;`¡i)-
equilibrium each player i plays a strategy that is constant within his equivalence classes and maximizes
his expected payoﬀ. If (`i;`¡i) is uncertain, we assume a commonly known common prior ¸ on levels and let
players with diﬀerent quotient spaces be diﬀerent players that possess the same information as the original
players from whom they are derived: in a ¸-equilibrium each of these new players has a strategy that is
constant within his equivalence classes and maximizes the expectation of his payoﬀ with respect to the state
of nature, the other players’ type, and the other players’ levels `¡i as well.
The way in which we introduce uncertainty about players’ levels of sophistication deserves a few comments.
In the class of games we consider, we have a common prior f on the state of nature, player i’s type, and
player ¡i’s type – respectively denoted by µ, ti, and t¡i. We can think of f as the marginal of another
distribution – denote it F – on µ, ti, t¡i, `i, and `¡i. Then, ¸ is the marginal of F on `i and `¡i. We assume
that F is given by the product of f and ¸, which is equivalent to (`i;`¡i) being independent of (µ;ti;t¡i).1
In the original game, a type ti has a posterior on µ and t¡i, but once we allow for the possibility of boundedly
rational players, a type ti of level `i should have a posterior on µ, t¡i, and `¡i. Indeed, ti needs to know
what ¡i is conditioning his expected payoﬀ on in order to outguess what action ¡i is going to take. The
question is how to formalize this idea. One could let player i’s strategy map each (ti;`i) into an action.
Otherwise, one could: (i) as usual, let player i’s strategy be a map that associates an action to each ti; (ii)
enlarge the set of players and treat a player i of level `i and any player i of level `0
i 6= `i as distinct players.
Since our primary objective is to provide researchers with a familiar and parsimonious tool for dealing with
bounded rationality in games with incomplete information, we opted for the latter solution. By means of
suitable transformations of the payoﬀ functions, we obtain that in our ¸-equilibria players do not have to
form beliefs about the levels of sophistication (i.e., player i does not have to think about `¡i, about what
¡i thinks about `i, and so forth). Importantly, this does not prevent us from deriving results that match
behavioral patterns found in the laboratory.2
As an illustration of the theory, we consider two well-known examples where high-order beliefs play a key
role, namely, Rubinstein’s (1989) electronic mail game3 and Morris and Shin’s (2002) game with private and
public information. We obtain, respectively, (`i;`¡i)-equilibria and ¸-equilibria that appear to be closer to
experimental evidence than usual game-theoretical predictions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the notation; Section 3 introduces the `i-quotient space
and computes (`i;`¡i)-equilibria for the electronic mail game; Section 4 presents the case where players’
1In Section 4.1 we explain the technical reasons that motivate such an assumption.
2We are unaware of whether the two modeling choices are equivalent or one is more expressive than the other.
3See also Halpern (1986) on the coordinated-attack problem in computer science.
2levels of sophistication (`i;`¡i) in distinguishing types are uncertain and computes Morris and Shin’s (2002)
game with private and public information; Section 5 concludes by summarizing related research.
2 Preliminaries
We consider two-player static games of incomplete information. Players are denoted by i;¡i 2 I = f1;2g,
where ¡i = j 2 I such that j 6= i. The concepts developed straightforwardly extend to the case of ﬁnitely
many players 2 · jIj < 1. Our setup builds on Siniscalchi (2008). At the center of the construction is the
set of all states of nature £ consisting of payoﬀ-relevant information players are uncertain about. A typical
element of £ is denoted by µ.
For an arbitrary space S, let ¢(S) denote the set of probability measures on the Borel ¾-algebra of S,
endowed with the weak¤ topology. Product spaces are always endowed with the product topology and
subspaces with the subspace topology. Countable spaces are endowed with the discrete topology. Given
a Polish (i.e., separable and completely metrizable) space £, let X0 = £ and for ` ¸ 1 deﬁne recursively
X` = X`¡1 £ ¢
¡
X`¡1¢





be the space of all possible belief hierarchies with




. Notice that H is Polish (e.g., by Corollary 3.39 and Theorem 15.15 in
Aliprantis and Border, 2006). Reﬁning H to Hc =
©
¹ 2 H : 8` ¸ 1;margX`¡1¹`+1 = ¹`ª
yields the space
of coherent belief hierarchies. Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) show the existence of a homeomorphism
gc : Hc ! ¢(£ £ H). The space Hc can be further reﬁned in the following manner. Let H0 = Hc and
for every k ¸ 1 deﬁne Hk =
©





. This yields Hcc = \k¸1Hk, the space of
belief hierarchies satisfying common certainty of coherence. Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) also show the





£-based type space.4 This notion can be generalized as follows.




, where £ and each Ti are Polish, and
each fi : Ti ! ¢(£ £ T¡i) is continuous.
A point in Ti is denoted by ti, which is a type for player i. fi (ti) is type ti’s posterior on the state of nature
and on ¡i’s type. Throughout, there is a commonly known common prior f 2 ¢(£ £ Ti £ T¡i), such that
each fi (ti)(¢) = f (¢ j ti). A point (µ;ti;t¡i) 2 £ £ Ti £ T¡i is a state of the world and is the realization of
the random
³
e µ;e ti;e t¡i
´
distributed according to f.
Each type ti in a £-based type space can be mapped into an inﬁnite hierarchy of beliefs. To see this, let
h1
i : Ti ! ¢
¡
X0¢
be given by h1
i (ti) = margX0fi (ti). h1
i (ti) 2 ¢
¡
X0¢
is type ti’s ﬁrst-order belief, and
corresponds to the marginal on the state of nature of player i’s posterior. For ` ¸ 2, let h`





i (ti)(E) = fi (ti)
¡©










for every Borel subset E µ X`¡1. h`
i (ti) 2 ¢
¡
X`¡1¢
is type ti’s `th-order belief. Finally, let hi : Ti ! H be






. hi (ti) 2 H is type ti’s entire belief hierarchy.
4For an analogous yet technically diﬀerent construction where £ is compact, see Mertens and Zamir (1985); Heifetz (1995)
covers the case where £ is possibly non-compact Hausdorﬀ and beliefs are regular Borel probability measures.








¡i µ Hcc, is a belief-closed subspace of ££Hcc £Hcc if for every
i 2 I and every ¹i 2 H
cc






= 1. It can be shown that hi (Ti);h¡i (T¡i) µ Hcc
indeed form a belief-closed subspace of £ £ Hcc £ Hcc (e.g., by Proposition 3 of Battigalli and Siniscalchi,
1999).
Assumption 1 Each Ti is compact and each hi is one-to-one.
By construction, hi is continuous (again, by Proposition 3 of Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999). Assumption
1 requires it to be one-to-one. This is a non-redundancy assumption: hi (ti) = hi (t0
i) implies ti = t0
i. If
Assumption 1 holds, then each hi is a continuous one-to-one map from a compact space to the Hausdorﬀ
space H (Polish spaces are metrizable, hence Hausdorﬀ). It follows that: (i) each hi is a closed map; (ii)
each hi is an embedding, i.e., hi : Ti ! hi (Ti) is a homeomorphism (e.g., by Theorem 2.36 in Aliprantis and
Border, 2006). Thus, £ £ Ti £ T¡i is homeomorphic to a belief-closed subspace of £ £ Hcc £ Hcc.
3 Quotient type spaces
We can now deﬁne the `i-quotient type spaces. For `i ¸ 1, let h
1;`i















. In words, h
1;`i




i (ti). It is these partial hierarchies that determine the elements of our quotient spaces.
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Let ³`i : Ti ! T
`i
i , ³`i (ti) = [ti] =
n
t0







be the corresponding quotient map (e.g.,









i with the quotient topology induced by ³`i: E µ T
`i
i is open in T
`i
i if and only if
£
³`i¤¡1
(E) is open in
Ti. An element of T
`i
i is denoted by t
`i
i , which we refer to as an `i-type and which is an equivalence class of
types ti 2 Ti.
In many applications, one can ﬁnd `i < 1 such that T
`i
i = fftig : ti 2 Tig. That is, one can ﬁnd a ﬁnite
reasoning level `i such that a level-`i player is unboundedly rational (e.g., in the game of Section 4.1.1).
Sometimes, however, such a ﬁnite `i does not exist (e.g., in the game of Section 3.1.1). It is therefore
notationally convenient to identify the unbounded-rationality benchmark with `i = 1 and let T1
i be the
quotient space induced by the quotient map ³1 (ti) = ft0
i 2 Ti : hi (t0
i) = hi (ti)g. For every i 2 I, we write
Li =
n





[ f1g for the set of all possible levels.
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i . It is continuous since ³`i is a quotient map and h
1;`i
i = '`i ± ³`i is continuous
4(e.g., by Theorem 22.2 in Munkres, 2000). T
`i
i is compact, as it is the image under the continuous ³`i of the































Corollary 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then T
`i
i is Polish (i 2 I, `i 2 Li n f1g).
Proof. A subset of a Polish space is Polish if and only if it is a G± set (e.g., by Corollary 3.5, Lemma 3.33,








, as in metrizable spaces every closed set is G± (e.g., by Corollary 3.19 in Aliprantis







being a closed map. ¥
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
The deﬁned quotient spaces are compatible with standard equilibrium analysis. Let the space Ai contain
player i’s pure actions, which are denoted by ai. A strategy for player i is a measurable map ¾i : Ti ! Ai.
The set of all strategies is denoted by §i.5
Deﬁnition 3 A strategy ¾i 2 §i is T
`i




i ! Ai such that
¾i = b ¾
`i
i ± ³`i.6
In particular, for a T
`i
i -measurable strategy ¾i we have that ³`i (ti) = ³`i (t0
i) implies ¾i (ti) = ¾i (t0
i) for all
ti;t0
i 2 Ti. If player i is of level `i, then ¾i must be T
`i
i -measurable. This way, the corresponding distribution
of actions can be derived from the distribution of `i-types, as if player i’s type space were T
`i
i instead of Ti.
Player i’s payoﬀ function is given by the measurable ui : £ £ Ai £ A¡i ! R. A Bayesian game is a tuple
¡ =
­
I;(Ai)i2I ;£;(Ti)i2I ;(fi)i2I ;(ui)i2I
®
.






is a Bayesian Nash `-equilibrium (` = (`i;`¡i) 2 Li£L¡i)
of ¡ if each ¾¤
i is T
`i
i -measurable and, for each i 2 I and each ti 2 Ti,
¾¤











¯ ¯ e ti 2 ³`i(ti)
i
(3)
3.1.1 Example: The electronic mail game
Consider the game described in Rubinstein (1989), where I = f1;2g and £ = fµa;µbg is given by
µa =




1  2 a b
a 0;0 1;¡L
b ¡L;1 M;M
5We leave out mixed strategies because when Ti is uncountable they involve measurability issues (e.g., see Aumann, 1964,
and Milgrom and Weber, 1985) that are beyond the scope of our paper. Indeed, all our examples feature equilibria in pure
strategies.
6Existence of such a b ¾
`i
i implies that ¾i is measurable with respect to the ¾-algebra given by the sets

³`i
¡1 (E) such that
E is Borel in T
`i
i .
5with 1 < M < L. The state of nature is µa with probability ½ 2 (0;1). Only player 1 is informed about
whether µa or µb is the realization of e µ. If e µ = µb, then an automatic communication protocol has players
sequentially sending e-mails to each other - starting from player 1 sending an e-mail to player 2 - that fail
to be delivered with probability ² 2 (0;1). Let T1 = T2 = f0;1;2;:::g count the number of e-mails sent
by a given player. By deﬁning n(t1;t2) = jft0
1 2 T1 : t0
1 < t1gj + jft0
2 2 T2 : t0
2 < t2gj + 1, we can write the
underlying common prior on £ £ T1 £ T2 as
f (µ;t1;t2) = ½ ¢ 1fµ=µag + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ²)
n(t1;t2) ² ¢ 1fµ=µbg (4)













by choosing ¾i : Ti ! Ai subject to ¾i being T
`i
i -measurable.7 In constrast with
the unique Bayesian Nash (1;1)-equilibrium, action b may be chosen in a boundedly rational `-equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For any k 2 f1;2;:::g, there exists ` = (`1;`2) 2 f1;2;:::;1g
2 and an associated Bayesian
Nash `-equilibrium of the electronic mail game in which players that have sent k or more messages play
action b.
Proof. Let `1 < `2 · 1.8 Notice that T1
1 = T1
2 = ff0g;f1;2;:::gg because: (i) only the type that has
sent no e-mails believes e µ = µa with positive probability; (ii) all types that have sent at least one e-mail
believe e µ = µb. Suppose player 1 has sent exactly e t1 = t1 ¸ 2 messages. In terms of lower bounds on the
other player’s type, player 1 then believes e t2 ¸ t1 ¡ 1, that player 2 believes e t1 ¸ t1 ¡ 1, that 2 believes
1 believes e t2 ¸ t1 ¡ 2, that 2 believes 1 believes 2 believes e t1 ¸ t1 ¡ 2, and so forth. Thus, by letting













e t2 = t2 ¸ 1. As lower bounds, player 2 then believes e t1 ¸ t2, that 1 believes e t2 ¸ t2 ¡ 1, that 1 believes
2 believes e t1 ¸ t2 ¡ 1, that 1 believes 2 believes 1 believes e t2 ¸ t2 ¡ 2, and so on. Thus, by letting













follows that, with `1 < `2, T
`2
2 is no coarser than T
`1
1 .
By iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies at an interim level, ¾1 (0) = a, which implies ¾2 (0) =

























= ::: = b. There
remains to check that 1’s ex-ante payoﬀ under this strategy is maximal. One shows that the equilibrium is
sustained under the condition ² · ²¤ = M¡1
M+L¡1.
To prove the claim, let `1 be such that 1
2e(`1) + 1 = k. ¥
This is consistent with experimental evidence by Camerer (2003): subjects tend to play action b already
after few messages exchanged.
3.2 Countable £-based Type Spaces




is countable if the following Assumption 2 is veriﬁed.
7If Ti is countable, then the ex-ante perspective is equivalent to the interim perspective of Deﬁnition 4. If instead Ti is
uncountable, a strategy ¾i that maximizes the ex-ante payoﬀ need not maximize the interim payoﬀ on a subset of types ti of
null measure.
8Equilibria for `2 < 1 and `2 · `1 · 1 can be found with analogous computations.
6Assumption 2 £ £ Ti £ T¡i is countable.




























. The product of the identity map on £ and
the quotient map ³`¡i deﬁnes a map ³
`i
£ = id£ £ ³`¡i : £ £ T¡i ! £ £ T
`¡i
¡i , which in turn induces
a b ³
`i
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for % 2 ¢(£ £ T¡i) and
E µ £ £ T
`¡i
¡i . Finally, let f
`i;`¡i






















is a countable £-based type space
(` = (`i;`¡i) 2 Li £ L¡i).
Proof. T
`i
i is Polish for i 2 I, since each of these `i-quotient type spaces are countable - possibly ﬁnite, as
in the e-mail game of Section 3.1.1 - and can be shown to inherit the discrete topology from Ti (i.e., every
subset of each T
`i
i is open). By the discrete topology, each f
`i
i is continuous. ³
`i
£ is a continuous map between
metrizable spaces, thus b ³
`i
£ is continuous (e.g., by Theorem 15.14 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006). It follows
that each composite map f
`i;`¡i



































is a Bayesian Nash `-










is a Bayesian Nash (1;1)-
equilibrium of ¡` (` = (`i;`¡i) 2 Li £ L¡i).

























































































































Therefore, an action ai satisﬁes (3) for game ¡ with players’ levels (`i;`¡i) if and only it satisﬁes (3) for ¡`
with players’ levels (1;1). ¥
4 Uncertainty about players’ levels
More realistically, players’ levels ` = (`i;`¡i) may be private information. To address this, we treat
players of diﬀerent levels as diﬀerent players. Such new players have the same information as the orig-
inal players from whom they are derived (see Deﬁnition 5 in Section 4.1 below). As before, let Li =
7n





[f1g, i 2 I. Let L = Li £L¡i and assume there is a common prior ¸ 2 ¢(L)
that is common knowledge between the players. Let Li = f`i 2 Li : `i 2 supp(margLi¸)g. The expanded
set of players is Ie = Li [ L¡i. jIej =
P
i2I jsupp(margLi (¸))j is the total number of players. The set of
players other than `i is Ie
¡`i = L¡i so that, in particular, Ie
¡`i \ Li = ; for any `i 2 Ie. That goes to say
that player `i does not face any `0
i, but only some `¡i.
4.1 Equilibrium analysis
Let player `i’s set of pure actions be A
`i
i = Ai, with typical element a
`i





i 2 §i. Player `i’s posterior on the other player’s level `¡i is given by the map ¸i : Li !
¢(L¡i), such that ¸i (`i)(¢) = ¸(¢ j `i). Player `i’s payoﬀ function is u
`i






































that occur with probabilities (¸(`i)(`¡i))`¡i2L¡i. The game without uncertainty of Section
3.1.1 is a special case where ¸ is degenerate at some ` = (`i;`¡i).
It is essential that ¸i (`i)(¢) only depends on `i. If ¸i (`i)(¢) were to depend on either ti or t¡i, then u
`i
i would





If ¸i (`i)(¢) depended on µ, then player i could infer the state of nature by knowing his level. He would
therefore be conditioning his expected payoﬀ both on his type belonging to the respective equivalence class
and on his level being `i. If this were true, then ¡i would need to form beliefs about i’s level of sophistication,
but this is precisely what we want to avoid.
The function u
`i
i has to be measurable. A suﬃcient condition for this is its continuity - which is satisﬁed in
our applications.















is a Bayesian Nash ¸-equilibrium




i -measurable and, for each `i 2 Ie and each ti 2 Ti,
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¯ ¯ e ti 2 ³`i(ti)
¸
(7)
4.1.1 Example: A game with private and public information
Consider a version of the game described in Morris and Shin (2002), where I = f1;2g and the state of nature
µ follows an improper uniform distribution on £ = R. Both players receive a public signal y = µ +²y, where
²y » U [¡c;c], c > 0. In addition, each of them privately observes a signal xi = µ + ²i, where ²i » U [¡c;c],
i 2 I. The random variables µ, ²y, ²1, and ²2 are all indepedent of each other. Payoﬀs are given by
ui (µ;ai;a¡i) = ¡(1 ¡ º)(ai ¡ µ)
2 ¡ º (ai ¡ a¡i)
2 (8)
where º 2 (0;1) is a parameter. We have Ti =
©











i is such that ³1
i (ti) = ³1
i (t0
i) if and only if [xi = x0




i = ::: = ³1
i .9 To interpret, a player of level 1 does not distinguish private and public signal.






¸(1;1) = p2, ¸(1;1) = ¸(1;1) = p(1 ¡ p), and ¸(1;1) = (1 ¡ p)
2. The payoﬀ function for player i of
































We look for symmetric linear equilibria of the form a`
i = ·`xi + (1 ¡ ·`)y, ·` 2 (0;1), ` 2 f1;1g, i 2 I.
Proposition 5 For each p 2 (0;1) there exists a Bayesian Nash ¸-equilibrium such that the mean weight
put on the private signal (i.e., p·1 + (1 ¡ p)·1) is larger than when there is common certainty that both
players are unboundedly rational (i.e., when p = 0).
Proof. Let Â





i µ + ºpE
`i
i a1
¡i + º (1 ¡ p)E
`i
i a1
¡i, where for any random variable z, E
`i


















i z = E[z j xi;y]. If ·1 = 1
2, then a1
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have that for any ® 2 (0;1)
E1



























The best-response to ·1 = 1
2 and any ·1 2 (0;1) is therefore ·1 = 1
2. As to ·1, we have a1








+ º (1 ¡ p)E1
i [·1x¡i + (1 ¡ ·1)y], from which ·1 =
2¡2º+ºp
2(2¡º+ºp).






, which is larger than the standard (1;1)-equilibrium
weight 1¡º
2¡º. ¥
These results are consistent with experimental evidence by Cornand and Heinemann (2009). Also, notice that
limp!1 ·1 = 2¡º
4 , which is the best-response of a level-2 player to a level-1 player who equally randomizes
between signals in their level-k/cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004, Nagel, 1995, Stahl
and Wilson, 1994, 1995).
5 Related Literature
Kets (2010) characterizes extended type structures, which feature Harsanyi type structures as special cases.
As in the Harsanyi framework, each type in an extended type structure is associated with beliefs about the
state of nature and the other player’s types, yet the beliefs of diﬀerent types are allowed to be deﬁned on
diﬀerent ¾-algebras. These ¾-algebras reﬂect types’ coarseness of perception of their opponent’s high-order
beliefs. The author shows that standard Harsanyi type structures are characterized by common certainty
that each player has an inﬁnite depth of reasoning. The diﬀerence with our model is twofold: (i) we do not
impose cognitive limitations on player i’s capacity to perceive player ¡i’s high-order beliefs, but rather on




such that [xi = y0 and y = x0
i] have diﬀerent second-order beliefs.
9i’s capacity to perceive his own high-order beliefs; (ii) we place emphasis on being in a position to retain
the standard game-theoretical tools for equilibrium analysis of incomplete-information games. By contrast,
in Kets’ (2010) analysis of the e-mail game, player i with depth of reasoning `i plays strategies that are
rationalizable for him given his coarse perception of player ¡i’s high-order beliefs. This amounts to each
player i perceiving a diﬀerent game of incomplete information in which: (i) his set of types is the same as
in the original game; (ii) player ¡i’s set of types is changed according to i’s own perception of player ¡i’s
high-order beliefs; (iii) player i plays strategies that are rationalizable in the modiﬁed game.10
Jehiel (2005) proposes a solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information, the analogy-based
expectation equilibrium. Jehiel and Koessler (2008) make use of analogy-based expectations in static two-
player games of incomplete information. The basic idea behind their analogy-based expectation equilibrium is
that player i plays best-responses to player ¡i’s average strategy within analogy classes, which are bundles
of states of the world. The authors interpret the analogy-based expectation equilibrium as “the limiting
outcome of a learning process involving populations of players i = 1;2, who would get a coarse feedback
about the past behavior of players in population j 6= i and no feedback on their own past performance
until they exit the system” (p. 534). They then apply their theory to the e-mail game and ﬁnd the same
threshold for the probability with which each message gets lost as we do. However, this should be seen as
a mere coincidence, as generally analogy-based expectation equilibria need not coincide with Bayesian Nash
equilibria of a game with modiﬁed information partitions.
Dulleck (2007) resolves the e-mail game paradox by assuming that a player loses track of the number of
e-mails received in a given interval and that the corresponding information structure is common knowledge
between players. While this is close in spirit to our approach, the analysis falls short of addressing formally
where the confusion about the e-mail count originates, and the model is speciﬁc to the e-mail game, leaving
open how it can be adapted to other situations of strategic interaction.
Finally, Strzalecki (2010) develops a level-k/cognitive hierarchy model to show that coordination on the
Pareto-eﬃcient outcome is possible in the e-mail game, provided sophisticated players put enough weight
on the other being less sophisticated. The model builds on a non-equilibrium approach according to which
players are boundedly rational in terms of reasoning about actions (i.e., what i thinks ¡i thinks ::: will
play) but unboundedly rational in terms of epistemic reasoning (i.e., what i thinks ¡i thinks ::: about the
state of nature). On the contrary, we do not depart from equilibrium analysis and our quotient type spaces
have clear-cut interpretations of players’ ability – or inability – to precisely perceive high-order beliefs about
states of nature.
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